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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
To safeguard private pensions, Congress enacted the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 
88 Stat. 829, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. Six years 
later, Congress tried to shore up multiemployer pension plans 
by passing the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act 
of 1980 (MPPAA), Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208. The 
MPPAA imposes liability on employers who withdraw from 
covered plans by ceasing contributions in whole or in part. This 
appeal involves one type of partial withdrawal, “bargaining 
out,” which occurs when an employer “permanently ceases to 
have an obligation to contribute under one or more but fewer 
than all collective bargaining agreements under which the em-
ployer has been obligated to contribute . . . but continues to 
perform work . . . of the type for which contributions were pre-
viously required.” 29 U.S.C. § 1385(b)(2)(A)(i) (ERISA 
§ 4205(b)(2)(A)(i)).  
I 
The relevant facts are undisputed. Appellee Caesars En-
tertainment Corporation (CEC) once operated four casinos in 
Atlantic City: Caesars, Bally’s, Harrah’s, and Showboat. These 
comprised a “controlled group” under ERISA, with CEC being 
the “single employer” of the group. 29 U.S.C. § 1301(b)(1) 
(ERISA § 4001(b)(1)); accord 29 C.F.R. § 4001.2. CEC bar-
gained with the International Union of Operating Engineers, 
Local 68 (the Union), for engineering work at all four casinos. 
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Under their collective bargaining agreements with the Union, 
each casino had to contribute to the Union’s multiemployer 
pension fund (the Fund). The Fund had 259 contributing em-
ployers making some $14 million in annual payments. See Lo-
cal 68 Engineers Union Pension Plan, Form 5500: FY 2013 
Annual Return/Report of Employee Benefit Plan 2, 23 (2015).  
In 2014, the Showboat casino closed, and CEC stopped 
contributing to the Fund for engineering work there. The other 
three casinos under CEC’s control remain open, and CEC con-
tinues to pay the Fund for their Union work. Showboat’s clo-
sure reduced CEC’s total contributions to the Fund by 17%—
well below the MPPAA’s 70% threshold that would have auto-
matically triggered liability for a partial withdrawal. See 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1381, 1385(a)(1).  
Although CEC was not automatically liable, the Fund 
claimed CEC was liable under the bargaining out provision of 
the MPPAA, which applies when an employer: 
[1] permanently ceases to have an obligation to 
contribute under one or more but fewer than all 
collective bargaining agreements under which 
the employer has been obligated to contribute 
under the plan but [2] continues to perform work 
in the jurisdiction of the collective bargaining 
agreement of the type for which contributions 
were previously required or transfers such work 
to another location or to an entity or entities 
owned or controlled by the employer. 
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Id. § 1385(b)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added); see id. § 1385(a)(2). 
CEC disagreed. So the parties went to arbitration, and CEC 
lost. The arbitrator held CEC had triggered both clauses [1] and 
[2] of the bargaining out provision. As relevant to this appeal, 
the arbitrator reasoned clause [2] applied because “[t]he type 
of work for which contributions were required at the closed 
Showboat is the same type of work currently being done at the 
remaining casinos.” 2 App. 345.  
The District Court reversed the arbitrator’s decision. 
Caesars Entm’t Corp. v. IUOE Local 68 Pension Fund, 2018 
WL 3000176, at *1 (D.N.J. June 15, 2018). The Court assumed 
without deciding that, under clause [1], the jurisdiction of the 
Showboat CBA included all engineering work in Atlantic City. 
But it held that, under clause [2], liability exists only when an 
employer replaces (a) work that contributes to the pension fund 
with (b) “work—of the same sort—that does not.” Id. at *8. 
Such replacement hadn’t occurred here because CEC’s “con-
stituent members [aside from the shuttered Showboat] continue 
to contribute to the Fund for all engineering work they perform 
throughout Atlantic City.” Id. at *9. To reach this conclusion, 
the Court relied on “authoritative guidance” from the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Id. at *7. The Fund’s 
appeal followed. 
II 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1401(b) and 1451(c). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291. We review the summary judgment that reversed the ar-
bitral award de novo, and we apply the same standard required 
of the District Court. E.g., Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 
243, 248 (3d Cir. 2010), as amended (May 25, 2010). We thus 
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review legal conclusions de novo but presume that the arbitra-
tor’s factual findings are correct unless they are clearly errone-
ous. SUPERVALU, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Sw. Pa. & W. Md. Area 
Teamsters & Emp’rs Pension Fund, 500 F.3d 334, 340 (3d Cir. 
2007). Only legal conclusions are at issue here. 
III 
We agree with the District Court that the dispositive 
question is whether under § 1385(b)(2)(A)(i) “work . . . of the 
type for which contributions were previously required” in-
cludes work of the type for which contributions are still re-
quired. The statutory text and PBGC guidance confirm that the 
answer is no.  
A 
“Under the MPPAA, an employer who withdraws from 
a multiemployer pension plan becomes obligated to pay a pro-
portionate share of the plan’s unfunded vested benefits.” 
Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Pension 
Fund, 982 F.2d 857, 861 (3d Cir. 1992). The MPPAA imposes 
this liability to counter the threat withdrawals pose to plan sol-
vency. See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 
U.S. 717, 722–23 & nn.2–3 (1984). 
The bargaining out provision at issue in this appeal typ-
ically applies when there is a change in union representation or 
the employer negotiates out of an obligation to contribute to a 
plan. See, e.g., ABA Section of Labor & Emp’t Law, Employee 
Benefits Law 17.III.B (4th ed. 2017 & Supp. 2018). Neither of 
those things happened here, but the Fund claims CEC contin-
ues to perform “work . . . of the type for which contributions 
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were previously required,” 29 U.S.C. § 1385(b)(2)(A)(i), be-
cause engineering work continues at Caesars, Bally’s, and Har-
rah’s. On the Fund’s view, it is irrelevant that CEC still must 
contribute to the Plan for the work performed by Union mem-
bers at those three casinos.  
We disagree. “[W]ork . . . of the type for which contri-
butions were previously required” means “work . . . of the type 
for which contributions are no longer required.” Two features 
of the text stand out. First, “previously” connotes something 
that is no longer the case. In arriving at this conclusion, we give 
“previously” its ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted 
the relevant provision. E.g., New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. 
Ct. 532, 539 (2019). Around the time of the MPPAA’s enact-
ment, dictionary definitions of “previous” and its adverbial 
form included “coming or occurring before something else; 
prior: the previous owner.” The Random House Dictionary of 
the English Language 1535 (2d unabr. ed. 1987); see also The 
Oxford English Dictionary 1340 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “pre-
viously” as “at a previous or preceding time; before, before-
hand, antecedently”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1070 (5th ed. 
1979) (defining “previous” as “antecedent; prior; before”). 
Similarly, the largest structured corpus of historical English 
shows that the word’s most common synonyms in the 1970s–
80s were “before” (the synonym used roughly 86% of the 
time), “earlier” (12%), and “formerly” (1%). See Corpus of 
Historical American English, BYU, https://www.english-cor-
pora.org/coha/ (last visited May 3, 2019); see also Muscarello 
v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 129 (1998) (using “crude[]” 
corpus linguistics to interpret what it means to “carry” a gun); 
Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary 
Meaning, 127 Yale L.J. 788 (2018) (explaining and applying 
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modern corpus linguistics).1 The corpus also shows that the 
words that most often co-occurred with “previously” (a.k.a. 
collocates) were “had” (35%) and “been” (15%)—perfect 
tense verbs that connote completed action. See, e.g., Carr v. 
United States, 560 U.S. 438, 448 (2010). So to say something 
is “previously required” is to suggest it is no longer required. 
Second, the canon against surplusage confirms that 
“previously” means “no longer required.” See, e.g., Advocate 
Health Care Network v. Stapleton, 137 S. Ct. 1652, 1659 
(2017) (applying the canon elsewhere in ERISA). If Congress 
had meant to adopt the Fund’s interpretation, it could have 
omitted “previously” to no effect. The provision would have 
targeted work “for which contributions were [ ] required.” Be-
cause that’s not what Congress wrote, we give “previously” 
some meaning. And that meaning tracks what we’ve learned 
from dictionaries and corpus linguistics.  
For these reasons, the best reading of “work . . . of the 
type for which contributions were previously required” ex-
cludes work of the type for which contributions are still re-
quired. To hold otherwise would put us in conflict with our sis-
ter courts’ interpretation of identical language in another 
                                              
1 Corpus linguistics describes language empirically with 
reference to books, scripts, magazines, newspapers, and more. 
A database of this naturally occurring language is called a cor-
pus. We can use corpora to perform analyses unavailable in 
standard sources like dictionaries. These analyses include 
measuring, in a given speech community over a given time, the 
statistical frequency of a word and the linguistic contexts in 
which it appears. See Lee & Mouritsen, supra, at 806–13, 828–
32.  
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MPPAA provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1383(b)(2)(B)(i) (ERISA 
§ 4203(b)(2)(B)(i)). Section 1383(b)(2)(B)(i) imposes com-
plete withdrawal liability on employers in the construction in-
dustry when they continue to perform “work . . . of the type for 
which contributions were previously required.” Two of our sis-
ter courts have held that the same provision imposes liability 
only when employers “cease making payments to the plan” for 
a type of work (e.g., construction) “while continuing to do [that 
work] in the area.” Resilient Floor Covering Pension Tr. Fund 
Bd. of Trs. v. Michael’s Floor Covering, Inc., 801 F.3d 1079, 
1090 (9th Cir. 2015); see Stevens Eng’rs & Constructors, Inc. 
v. Local 17 Iron Workers Pension Fund, 877 F.3d 663, 671–72 
(6th Cir. 2017). And two more courts of appeals have signaled 
their support for this holding. See Ind. Elec. Workers Pension 
Benefit Fund v. ManWeb Servs., Inc., 884 F.3d 770, 781 (7th 
Cir. 2018) (applying the Ninth Circuit’s analysis to MPPAA 
successor liability); Ceco Concrete Const., LLC v. Centennial 
State Carpenters Pension Tr., 821 F.3d 1250, 1254 (10th Cir. 
2016) (citing the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in interpreting the 
construction provision). We see no reason to interpret identical 
language in the bargaining out provision any differently. 
B 
We find additional support for our view in longstanding 
guidance from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, an 
agency that administers ERISA. See Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. 
v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 637 (1990). Courts “have tradi-
tionally deferred to the PBGC when interpreting ERISA,” be-
cause to ignore the agency “‘would be to embark upon a voy-
age without a compass.’” Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 
96, 104 (2007) (alteration omitted) (quoting Mead Corp. v. Til-
ley, 490 U.S. 714, 726 (1989)).  
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In this case, the District Court found persuasive PBGC 
Opinion Letter 83-20, which says that no withdrawal liability 
results from “merely ceasing or terminating an operation.” 
PBGC Op. Letter 83-20, 1983 WL 22426, at *2 (Sept. 2, 1983). 
According to the PBGC, liability under the bargaining out pro-
vision arises “only [in] situations where work of the same type 
is continued by the employer but for which contributions to a 
plan which were required are no longer required.” Id. (empha-
sis added). So an employer isn’t liable when it “closes one [fa-
cility] and shifts the work of that [facility] to other [facilities] 
which are covered by other [CBAs] under which contributions 
are made to the plan.” Id. That’s precisely what happened here. 
And we, like the District Court, find that the PBGC’s view 
tracks the text of the MPPAA.   
The Fund cites two other PBGC Opinion Letters (86-21 
and 86-17), but both support CEC. Letter 86-21 involved an 
employer replacing plan-contributing work (packing produce 
in a shed) with non-contributing work (packing in a field). See 
PBGC Op. Letter 86-21, 1986 WL 38800, at *2 (Sept. 29, 
1986). So the PBGC concluded that the employer had partially 
withdrawn, assuming shed-packing and field-packing were the 
same “type” of work. See id. But unlike that employer, CEC 
didn’t shift to non-contributing work. It simply closed the 
Showboat operation.  
Letter 86-17 addressed a company closing a CBA-cov-
ered facility. See PBGC Op. Letter 86-17, 1986 WL 38796, at 
*1 (Aug. 1, 1986). Like CEC, that company continued to con-
tribute to the same pension plan through another facility. See 
id. But unlike CEC, that company outsourced the closed facil-
ity’s work to third-parties “unrelated to the [company] in any 
way.” Id. Even though that outsourcing arguably replaced con-
tributing work with non-contributing work, the PBGC held the 
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company wasn’t liable for bargaining out. The PBGC again 
stressed, as it did in Letter 83-20, that “in no case do these rules 
[of the bargaining out provision] impose liability on an em-
ployer for merely ceasing or terminating an operation; rather, 
they address only situations where work of the same type is 
continued by the employer but for which contributions to a 
plan which were required are no longer required.” Id. at *2 
(quoting 126 Cong. Rec. H7900 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1980) 
(statement of Rep. Frank Thompson, Jr.)). In sum, when the 
PBGC addressed practically the same situation we face here, it 
refused to find withdrawal liability against the employer.  
IV 
The Fund’s final response to the textual and administra-
tive headwinds we have described is an appeal to purposivism. 
According to the Fund, the “fundamental purpose” of the 
MPPAA is to ensure the solvency of employee pensions. Fund 
Br. 30. So CEC simply must be liable because Showboat’s clo-
sure decreased the Fund’s contribution base. And failing to im-
pose liability would allegedly allow a “race for the exits” in 
which the three other CEC casinos could stop contributing 
without consequence. Id.  
Once again, we disagree. The MPPAA’s purpose is nei-
ther one-dimensional nor easy to promote through employer 
liability. It’s certainly true that the MPPAA aims to foster both 
“maintenance and growth” of multiemployer plans. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 1001a(c)(2) (MPPAA, § 3(c)(2), 94 Stat. at 1209); accord Bd. 
of Trs. of Teamsters Local 863 Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 
296 F.3d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 2002). But as counsel for the Fund 
acknowledged at oral argument, if we adopted the Fund’s in-
terpretation, employers would even be liable for conduct that 
does not reduce their pension contributions. See Oral Argument 
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Audio 3:20–4:45. The risk of such capricious liability would 
discourage “the maintenance and growth of multiemployer 
pension plans” in the first place. 29 U.S.C. § 1001a(c)(2). In-
centives matter, and employers have many alternatives to mul-
tiemployer plans. See generally SEC, Employer-Sponsored 
Plans, Investor.gov (last visited Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.in-
vestor.gov/introduction-investing/retirement-plans/employer-
sponsored-plans [https://perma.cc/5PLE-KM3E]. So employ-
ers would be less likely to opt into the MPPAA’s regulatory 
regime if it imposed liability on innocuous business activities.  
The Fund’s position thus shows why “it frustrates rather 
than effectuates legislative intent simplistically to assume that 
whatever furthers the statute’s primary objective must be the 
law.” Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 526 (1987) (per 
curiam). Rather than appealing to broad statutory objectives, 
pension funds should look to Congress’s statutory safeguards 
against plan insolvency. Among these are the 70% rule for au-
tomatic partial withdrawals, 29 U.S.C. § 1385(a)(1), and a 
catch-all clause that imposes liability on “any transaction” that 
has “a principal purpose . . . to evade or avoid liability,” id. 
§ 1392(c) (ERISA § 4212(c)). For an employer to avoid auto-
matic liability, any decrease in contributions must be made 
gradually over an eight-year period. See id. § 1385(b)(1); Cent. 
States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Safeway, Inc., 229 F.3d 
605, 611 (7th Cir. 2000). And to avoid catch-all liability, an 
employer must act in good faith. SUPERVALU, Inc., 500 F.3d 
at 341–42. “Even if Congress could or should have done more, 
still it ‘wrote the statute it wrote—meaning, a statute going so 
far and no further.’” Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 
138 S. Ct. 1061, 1073 (2018) (quoting Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 794 (2014)). 
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* * * 
For the reasons stated, we hold that “work . . . of the 
type for which contributions were previously required” does 
not include work of the type for which contributions are still 
required. And because CEC continues to contribute to its pen-
sion plan for engineering work at its remaining three casinos, 
it is not liable under § 1385(b)(2)(A)(i). We will affirm the 
judgment of the District Court.  
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